NMa Rules on the Abuse of a Dominant Position by Gasunie

The Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa) has established that Gasunie, through its use of parts of the Commodity Diensten Systeem (CDS) [Commodity Services System], has abused its dominant position on the market for gas transmission. NMa will not impose a sanction. The Authority investigated the system of tariffs and conditions following complaints from various gas suppliers that they had experienced disadvantages due to the CDS.

The decision not to impose a sanction relates to developments on the gas market. With the introduction of the Gas Act and the liberalisation of the gas market on 1 January 2002, Gasunie replaced the CDS with a system of negotiated access based on indicative tariffs and conditions. The Office for Energy Regulation (DTe) has approved guidelines in this regard and maintains strict supervision of compliance with these. On the basis of these tariffs, the parties negotiate the definitive tariffs for gas transmission. DTe reached agreement with Gasunie for the year 2001 on the basis of provisional guidelines. Under this agreement, Gasunie was required, for instance, to reduce its tariffs in 2001 by 6.5 percent.

Gasunie applied the CDS up until 1 January 2002 to the transmission and supply of gas to customers with an annual gas consumption greater than 10 million cubic metres. Gas suppliers complained to NMa about this tariff system because they experienced disadvantages as a result of the so-called balancing regime and in relation to 'entry and exit points'. The balancing regime resulted in a situation where gas suppliers other than Gasunie were required to pay higher penalties for taking too much or too little gas from the network, while the same did not apply to Gasunie's gas supply operations. The system of entry and exit points (points at which gas enters or leaves the gas transmission network), results in a situation where Gasunie's customers are charged a transmission tariff based on a virtual 'entry point', while the customers of other gas suppliers are charged a transport tariff on the basis of the de facto 'entry point'. As a result, Gasunie's customers paid a transmission tariff on the basis of a transmission distance which, on average, was shorter than the customers of other gas suppliers. The gas transmission tariff that Gasunie was able to charge was therefore lower, on average, than the transmission tariff that the customers of other gas suppliers paid. Consequently the other gas suppliers were placed in a disadvantageous competitive position.