Independent agencies, political interference, and firm investment: evidence from the European Union

A discussion by

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Summary of the paper

FIGURE 1
Investment Rate at the IRA Inception, Before the Event, and After the Event (Subsample of Firms Undergoing the Change in Regulatory Regime)
Comments

• Effect of institutions on investment highly relevant problem
• Analysis potentially suffers from endogeneity
• Decision whether or not to erect IRA is endogenous.
• Example in paper: governments signal commitment not to intervene by erecting IRA
Comments

• The paper claims ‘To tackle this problem, we use instrumental variable methods that exploit the cross-country variation in the political and legal endowments that may ensure credibility to the regulatory institution (...)’

• In practice, they
  – apply SYS-GMM, i.e., using first-differenced lagged variables as instruments
  – Use external instruments such as ‘checks and balances and ‘rule of law.

• I am no expert on GMM, but a bit like von Munchhausen

• Somewhat unconvincing that rule of law and check and balances do not directly influence level of investment
Comments

• Timing of IRA also endogenous
• Decision to instigate IRA may coincide with other events.
  – Opening up of national markets
  – Privatization
  – Buoyant stock markets
• If privatization drives effect, this may explain lower effect IRA under right-wing governments
• Include privatization dummies, GDP growth into regression?