

### Smart Access Regulation in Electronic Communications

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- **1. Current Test**
- **2. Context and Principles**
- **3. Three dimensions of regulatory intervention**
- 4. Proposal for tests
- **5.** Conclusion



### **1. Current Test**

- Ex ante access
- TCT/SMP
  - Three-Criteria Test: superficially applied, not very clear
  - Significant Market Power: single or joint dominance but not further (non-coordinated behaviours without single dominance)
  - Remedies: Proportionality mildly applied
- Pre-defined bottlenecks
  - Physical infrastructures
- Dispute resolution



2. New Context

- Opening existing infrastructures → Stimulating investment in new infrastructures
- Monopoly  $\rightarrow$  Oligopoly
- National market  $\rightarrow$  Regional segmentation
- Silos in restricted value chain → Layers in extended value chain



# 2. Old Principles

- Minimise risks and costs of regulatory errors
  - Type I errors (over-regulation) and type II (underregulation)
  - Risks of errors depend of the test
  - Costs of errors may depend of context
- Minimise costs of implementation
  - Ease of implementation and legal certainty
- Based on economic and neutrality principles
  - Applied by NRAs



## **3. Types of Intervention**

- Ex ante (pure sector regulation)
- Dispute resolution (mild sector regulation)
- Ex post (pure competition law)



# **3. Tests for Intervention**

#### 1. Essential facility

- Indispensability of the input
- Elimination of competition in the downstream market
- Consumer harm, for instance no new product developed

#### 2. TCT/SMP revised

- TCT clarified (structural super-dominance) and applied (by NRAs for all markets)
- SMP clarified: covers tacit collusion

#### 3. TCT/SMP unchanged: *status quo*

- 4. Tight oligopoly/gap cases
  - To cover non-coordinated behaviours without single dominance

#### 5. Pre-defined bottlenecks



## **3. Tests for Intervention**

	Risk type I errors	Risk type II errors	Ease of application	Principle based
Essential facility	low	high	medium	high
TCT/SMP revised	low	high	medium	high
TCT/SMP unchanged	medium	medium	medium	high
Tight oligopoly	high	low	medium	low
Pre-defined bottlenecks	medium	medium	high	low



### **3. Tests for Remedies**

- Justified: necessary to solve identified market failures
- Proportionality
  - Low impact assessment
  - Full impact assessment, with quality control



## **3. Holistic Approach**

Remedies Test for intervention	Mild Impact assessment	Full Impact assessment
Essential facility	<ul> <li>Pure ex-ante</li> <li>Dispute resolution</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Pure ex-ante</li> <li>Dispute resolution</li> </ul>
TCT/SMP revised	<ul> <li>Pure ex-ante</li> <li>Dispute resolution</li> </ul>	<ul><li>Pure ex-ante</li><li>Dispute resolution</li></ul>
TCT/SMP unchanged	<ul><li>Pure ex-ante</li><li>Dispute resolution</li></ul>	<ul><li>Pure ex-ante</li><li>Dispute resolution</li></ul>
Tight oligopoly	<ul> <li>Pure ex-ante</li> <li>Dispute resolution</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Pure ex-ante</li> <li>Dispute resolution</li> </ul>
<b>Pre-defined bottlenecks</b>	<ul><li>Pure ex-ante</li><li>Dispute resolution</li></ul>	<ul><li>Pure ex-ante</li><li>Dispute resolution</li></ul>



### 4. Proposal for Tests

- One infrastructure
  - Subsidized: open with state aids rules
  - Non subsidized: open? With an essential facility test?
- Several infrastructures: oligopoly
  - With coordinated behaviours: open? with joint dominance test?
  - Without coordinated behaviours: hardest case, need full impact assessment



## 4. Proposal for Tests

Remedies Test for intervention	Mild Impact assessment	Full Impact assessment
Essential facility	<ul> <li>Pure ex-ante</li> <li>Dispute resolution</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Pure ex-ante</li> <li>Dispute resolution</li> </ul>
TCT/SMP revised	<ul><li>Pure ex-ante</li><li>Dispute resolution</li></ul>	<ul><li>Pure ex-ante</li><li>Dispute resolution</li></ul>
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- Take new context into account
- Keep old principles
  - Minimise errors costs and base on principles to be applied by NRAs
- Adopt a holistic approach
  - Type of intervention: ex ante, dispute resolution
  - Test for intervention: from essential facility to tight oligopoly
  - Test for remedies: from mild to full impact assessment



# **5.** Conclusion

- Test for access depends on policy choices
  - What kind of settings needed to be regulated and at what costs
- One infrastructure
  - Subsidised
  - Non-subsidised
- Oligopoly
  - Coordinated behaviours
  - Non-coordinated behaviours